



Relation Back of Amendments Adding Plaintiffs Under 
Rule 15(c) 
Introduction 
In 1998, Cary Cliff brought suit against OSI Collection Services, Inc., on 
behalf of himself and other similarly situated Florida residents.1 After the 
statute of limitations had run, Cliff filed an amendment, adding a 
nationwide class of plaintiffs.2 Suddenly, OSI found itself facing a 
potentially massive class action lawsuit and dramatically increased liability, 
and the court was faced with the decision of whether to allow the class 
complaint to relate back to the original time of filing for statute of 
limitations purposes, or to declare that the nationwide plaintiffs were time-
barred from bringing their action.3 
When a complaint is amended to add new plaintiffs after the statute of 
limitations has passed, allowing the amendment to relate back enables the 
new plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations.4 As a result, 
potentially massive class actions may be brought against defendants who 
were not expecting to defend against such claims. 
This comment examines the legal and policy concerns with allowing 
amendments adding plaintiffs to relate back. Part I introduces the concepts 
underlying the relation back doctrine by explaining that the policies behind 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict with the policies underlying 
statutes of limitations, and shows how Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c) seeks to reconcile these policies. It also explains that because 
amendments adding plaintiffs are not explicitly addressed in the rule, courts 
must adapt the rule to apply to such amendments. Part II analyzes the three 
different approaches courts have taken when determining whether to allow 
relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs: (1) the literal Rule 15(c) 
approach requiring mistake of identity; (2) the liberal approach focused on 
the absence of prejudice; and (3) the approach requiring notice of the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 1131-33. 
 4. Under the legal fiction of relation back, a court treats the untimely amendment as if 
it had been included in the timely-filed original complaint. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 
S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2010) (“[A]n amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a 
timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was filed outside an 
applicable statute of limitations.”). 
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existence and involvement of new plaintiffs. Part III focuses on the 
uncertainty surrounding this issue in the Tenth Circuit, surveying the 
district court cases and suggesting what approach the Tenth Circuit is likely 
to take if squarely confronted with the issue. 
Parts IV and V explore some of the complexities of relation back of 
amendments adding plaintiffs. Specifically, Part IV examines the potential 
application of state relation back law in federal courts, and Part V discusses 
the significant impact the relation back of plaintiffs can have in the class 
action context and considers the implications of various approaches in class 
action cases. Finally, Part VI proposes a standard for relation back of 
amendments adding plaintiffs. 
This comment maintains that in order to properly adapt Rule 15(c) to 
amendments adding plaintiffs, courts should impose requirements that 
respect the policies behind statutes of limitations. Thus, amendments 
adding plaintiffs should only relate back narrowly, when the defendant had 
notice that the plaintiff to be brought in by amendment previously asserted 
or attempted to assert a claim in court during the limitations period. 
Amendments adding plaintiffs should relate back only when (1) the original 
plaintiff had the legal capacity to assert claims on behalf of the new 
plaintiff, and (2) circumstances indicate that the new plaintiff intended to 
assert those claims. This approach upholds the policies behind statutes of 
limitations while furthering the principle that cases should be decided on 
their merits. 
I. Concepts Underlying Relation Back 
Relation back doctrine embodies the interplay between two conflicting 
policy choices: the policy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the policies underlying statutes of limitations.5 This section establishes 
several premises that are necessary to understand this policy conflict and 
how the conflict applies to the relation back of amendments adding 
plaintiffs. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to promote 
adjudication of conflicts on the merits. This policy requires that parties have 
wide latitude to correct and clarify pleadings. Second, statutes of limitations 
set a time period after which claims may not be brought, ensuring that 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See id. at 2494 (“[T]he purpose of relation back [is] to balance the interests of the 
defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their 
merits.”); see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.15 (3d ed. 
2011). 
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lawsuits are brought in a timely manner and that defendants are not called 
to defend themselves from stale claims. Third, Rule 15(c) attempts to 
balance the conflicting policies, and the requirements it imposes restrict 
relation back to those situations when the policies behind the statute of 
limitations are not violated. Finally, because amendments adding plaintiffs 
are not directly addressed in Rule 15(c), courts must apply the rule by 
analogy. Because allowing untimely plaintiffs to join an action technically 
violates the statute of limitations, amendments adding plaintiffs should only 
relate back in narrow circumstances that respect the policies underlying the 
statute of limitations. 
A. Policies Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
One of the primary policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to facilitate the adjudication of conflicts on the merits.6 This 
principle is particularly clear in the attitude the rules take to pleadings. The 
rules “reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”7 Pleading is not an 
end in itself, but is simply intended to facilitate the presentation of a case, 
providing a defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.”8 Therefore, a party should not prevail 
simply because the opponent’s pleading did not effectively state an 
otherwise meritorious claim.9 As the Supreme Court noted in Foman v. 
Davis, cases should not be dismissed “on the basis of such mere 
technicalities.”10 Therefore, the rules allow parties to amend the pleadings, 
instructing courts to give parties leave to amend whenever “justice so 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 47; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (summarizing pleading standards); 2 
MOORE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.10 (“[P]leadings should not be dismissed for technical 
defects. The pleading should be construed as a whole, to determine whether adequate notice 
of the claim or defense is presented.”). 
 9. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (“It is . . . entirely contrary to the spirit of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of 
such mere technicalities.”); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48; see also Staren v. Am. Nat’l Bank & 
Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976) (“It is well settled that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that 
cases are tried on the merits and to dispense with technical procedural problems.”). 
 10. 371 U.S. at 181. 
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requires.”11 The liberal attitude the rules take toward allowing pleadings to 
be amended is well-recognized.12 
Parties often seek leave to amend pleadings after the statute of 
limitations has run. Although claims or amendments made after the 
limitations period has expired are presumed to be time-barred,13 a strict 
application of this doctrine may yield unjust results where cases are decided 
on the basis of inconsequential mistakes instead of on the merits.14 One oft-
cited example is Kerner v. Rackmill, a 1953 case in which the plaintiff 
designated the defendant as an individual doing business as “Malibu Dude 
Ranch” when the proper defendant was “Malibu Dude Ranch, Inc.,” a 
corporation.15 An amendment was offered after the statute of limitations 
had run to correct this error, but the court held that the amendment would 
not relate back, even though the individual named in the complaint was an 
agent authorized to receive service on behalf of the corporation.16 The 
Kerner decision has been roundly criticized as contrary to the policy of 
deciding claims on their merits, rather than on technicalities.17 
Such decisions illustrate the need for some mechanism to amend 
pleadings, even once the statute of limitations has run, in order to enable a 
meritorious claim to go forward. Therefore, to allow pleadings to be 
clarified and corrected, the rules allow an amendment to relate back to the 
original date of filing when certain conditions are met.18 The original 
version of Rule 15(c) allowed relation back when the claim asserted in the 
                                                                                                                 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when 
justice so requires.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Staren, 529 F.2d at 1263; Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 
(5th Cir. 1968); Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234, 236 (10th 
Cir. 1951). 
 13. Williams, 405 F.2d at 237 (“[T]he rule is generally stated to be that relation back 
will not apply to an amendment that substitutes or adds a new party for those named initially 
in the earlier timely pleadings. The reasoning apparently is that such an addition amounts to 
the assertion of a ‘new cause of action,’ and if an amendment were allowed to relate back in 
that situation, the purpose of the statute of limitations would be defeated.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 14. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 15. 111 F. Supp. 150, 151 (M.D. Pa. 1953); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, 
§ 1498 n.4; Lawrence A. Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision: The Aftermath of the Supreme 
Court’s Eradication of the Relation-Back Doctrine, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 713, 720 (1990) 
(discussing the Kerner decision). 
 16. Kerner, 111 F. Supp. at 151-52. 
 17. See, e.g., 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498; Epter, supra note 15, at 720. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
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amendment arose out of the same transaction or occurrence stated in the 
original pleading.19 Thus, parties were able to clarify the original claim, 
expand or modify the facts alleged, increase the amount of relief sought, 
and even assert new theories of recovery.20 This rule has been gradually 
expanded, and the current version of Rule 15(c) allows amendments to 
relate back to the original filing date in three circumstances.21 First, an 
amendment may relate back if the applicable statute of limitations provides 
for relation back.22 Second, an amendment may relate back under Rule 
15(c)(1)(B) when it asserts a claim or defense that arises out of the same 
transaction or occurrence as that stated in the original pleading.23 Third, 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows an amendment changing or adding defendants to 
relate back under certain conditions.24 Although Rule 15(c) does not 
explicitly provide for amendments adding new plaintiffs, the Advisory 
Committee Notes suggest the rule may be applicable to amendments adding 
plaintiffs as well, stating that the “attitude” toward changing defendants 
“extends by analogy” to changing plaintiffs.25 
B. Policies Underlying Statutes of Limitations 
As the Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations “represent a 
public policy about the privilege to litigate.”26 By barring claims after a 
certain amount of time has passed, statutes of limitations compel plaintiffs 
to file claims within a specified period.27 “They are by definition arbitrary, 
and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966, 1991, 1993). 
 20. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1497. 
 21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
 22. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(A). 
 23. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(B). 
 24. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) (“An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when: . . . the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party 
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period 
provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by 
amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending 
on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought 
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”). 
 25. Id. Rule 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966) (“[T]he attitude taken in revised 
Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing 
plaintiffs.”). 
 26. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
 27. Id. at 313 (considering whether a statute of limitations extinguishes the underlying 
claim or merely the right to assert the claim in court); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 
(1879) (“Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a conclusive bar.”). 
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claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.”28 They represent the notion 
that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the 
right to prosecute them.”29 
Two policies underlie limitations statutes.30 First, statutes of limitations 
are founded on the concept that “at some point, claims should be laid to rest 
so that security and stability can be restored to human affairs.”31 The 
uncertainty created by pending litigation prevents defendants from moving 
forward and may “hinder the flow of commerce.”32 If potential defendants 
are freed from the concern of perpetually unsettled claims, both individuals 
and society are able to function more efficiently. Thus, one of the primary 
purposes of statutes of limitations is to provide a measure of certainty and 
repose for defendants.33 Second, the statutes relieve the court system of 
stale claims34 and prevent prejudice to defendants by requiring that 
plaintiffs bring actions before “evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”35 By enacting statutes of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Chase, 325 U.S. at 314. 
 29. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 30. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983); Burnett, 380 
U.S. at 428; Wood, 101 U.S. at 139; see also Developments in the Law—Statutes of 
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950); Laurie Helzick, Note, Looking 
Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 140-41 (1988). 
 31. Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 530 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 32. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex. 1986) 
(“Society’s interest in repose is to have disputes either settled or barred within a reasonable 
time. It is based on the theory that the uncertainty and insecurity caused by unsettled claims 
hinder the flow of commerce.”); see Pappion v. Dow Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 
(W.D. La. 1986) (“[D]efendants can stop worrying about prospective claims and can 
continue in the normal administration of their affairs.”); Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 
520 (D. Del. 1974) (stating that statutes of limitations ensure that “the defendant will be 
protected from the insecurity generated by the fear of litigation pending in perpetuity,” and 
“the marketplace will be free from the uncertainty of long pending and unsettled claims”); 
see also Wood, 101 U.S. at 139. 
 33. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“[Statutes of limitations] are 
statutes of repose.”); see also Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 (“They promote repose by giving 
security and stability to human affairs.”). 
 34. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“[Statutes of limitations] 
are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims . . . .”). 
 35. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). 
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limitations, legislatures recognize that it would be unjust to require a 
defendant to defend such a claim.36 
Statutes of limitations function by requiring plaintiffs to file timely suits 
and by punishing delay.37 Thus, the statutes are undermined if late-coming 
plaintiffs are given wide latitude to take advantage of the diligence of others 
by joining existing actions.38 The Supreme Court has made clear that “a 
plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights’” should generally be barred from 
asserting those rights once the limitations period has passed.39 
C. Relation Back Rules Must Balance the Conflicting Policies 
As the Supreme Court has stated, “the purpose behind relation back [is] 
to balance the interests of the defendant protected by the statute of 
limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . for resolving disputes on their merits.”40 However, this 
balance creates a tension between relation back and statutes of limitations.41 
Because statutes of limitations prohibit bringing a claim after a certain 
amount of time has passed, defendants may ordinarily assert a limitations 
defense against an untimely amendment.42 Allowing an amendment to 
relate back after the limitations period deprives the defendant of a 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (“Statutes of limitations . . . represent a pervasive 
legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a 
specified period of time . . . .”). 
 37. Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 (“[Statutes of limitations] stimulate to activity and punish 
negligence.”). 
 38. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting a liberal relation-back 
rule and declaring that “[s]uch a rule would undermine applicable statutes of limitations and 
make a mockery of the promise of repose”). 
 39. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 554 (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 
U.S. 424, 428 (1965)); see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) 
(“Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to 
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights . . . .”); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 
(distinguishing a situation in which a plaintiff has slept on his rights and should be time-
barred from situations in which the plaintiff should not be time-barred because he was 
prevented from bringing his suit by fraud or war). 
 40. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010). 
 41. E.g., Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974) (“The problem is the 
tension between the Rule 15 relation back provisions and the statute of limitations.”); see 
also Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494; Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 42. See, e.g., Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
120 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:113 
 
 
limitations defense and allows the plaintiff to assert a new claim even after 
the statute of limitations has expired.43 
However, the rules dictate that parties have wide latitude to correct and 
clarify pleadings.44 Without relation back, an attempt to correct a good-faith 
mistake or clarify a crucial point could be arbitrarily barred by a limitations 
defense.45 As the Supreme Court noted in Kruspski v. Costa Crociere 
S.p.A., while “[a] prospective defendant who legitimately believed that the 
limitations period had passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong 
interest in repose,” it would be unfair to allow a defendant to avoid liability 
“only because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about [the 
defendant’s] identity” during the limitations period.46 Thus, as Justice 
Stevens observed, “[T]he principle purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a 
plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if 
the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way.”47 In other 
words, relation back allows a party to amend a meritorious claim, so long as 
the policies behind the statute of limitations are respected.48 
As noted, the liberal approach of the rules allows wide latitude for 
pleadings to be amended.49 However, in an effort to allow parties wide 
latitude in amending their pleadings, some courts not only liberally allow 
for amendments, but also seek to liberally allow amendments changing 
parties to relate back to the original filing date when they would otherwise 
be time-barred by the statute of limitations.50 While courts should liberally 
allow amendments to be made to avoid adjudication based on technicalities, 
amendments changing parties should relate back only in particular 
circumstances. Rule 15(c) addresses this issue by allowing relation back 
only when the policies behind the statute of limitations are not violated.51 
  
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[A]mendments as 
a general matter are favored in order ‘to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’” (quoting 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957))). 
 45. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. E.g., Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974). 
 49. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 51. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he rule strikes a 
carefully calibrated balance.”); Yorden, 374 F. Supp. at 520 (“Rule 15 has been carefully 
drafted to defer to the policies underlying such statutes.”). 
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D. How Rule 15(c) Addresses Statute of Limitations Considerations 
The rules distinguish between amendments adding new claims, which 
are addressed in Rule 15(c)(1)(B), and amendments changing parties, which 
are addressed by Rule 15(c)(1)(C).52 Prior to 1966, Rule 15(c) focused only 
on amending claims and did not address amendments changing parties.53 
However, some federal courts relied on the rule to allow amendments 
pertaining to the parties to relate back to avoid injustice.54 Such situations 
included the correction of misnomers55 and the addition of defendants who 
had an identity of interest with the original defendant, and thus had 
sufficient notice of the action prior to the running of the limitations 
period.56 Other courts, however, adopted a strict interpretation of the rule 
and refused to allow relation back of amendments changing parties, even to 
correct the slightest mistakes.57 One recurrent problem was with individuals 
who attempted to bring lawsuits against the federal government challenging 
the denial of Social Security benefits, but failed to designate the proper 
defendant: the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare.58 These plaintiffs were subsequently barred from correcting the 
mistakes when they were discovered because the statute of limitations had 
expired in the meantime.59 In direct response to these and similar cases, the 
rule was amended in 1966 to specifically allow for the relation back of 
amendments changing parties.60 
Because the relation back of amendments changing claims and the 
relation back of amendments changing parties are related, it is tempting to 
apply the rationale behind the former to cases involving the latter.61 
However, the two types of amendments are distinct, and each implicates 
different statute of limitations considerations. A discussion of this 
distinction is necessary to highlight the specific purpose each Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) requirement serves. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), with id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 
 53. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 6-7 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 56. Meltzer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 25 F.R.D. 62, 65-66 (N.D. Ohio 1960). 
 57. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498. 
 58. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1968) (drawing on 
cases involving amendments changing claims in determining whether to allow relation back 
of amendment adding plaintiff). 
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1. Rule 15(c)(1)(B) 
When a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to modify the claim once 
the limitations period has expired, notice is the primary consideration.62 
This is because the pleading rules require only that a pleading put the 
defendant on notice to prepare a defense.63 Pleadings are not required to 
state specific legal theories or causes of action.64 Thus, amendments 
asserting or clarifying transactionally related claims logically relate back to 
the original filing date.65 “[S]o long as the different theories introduced by 
the amendment fuse together within the ‘conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence’ set forth in the complaint,”66 the newly asserted claims can be 
considered encompassed by the original complaint, and the policy behind 
the statute of limitations is satisfied.67 
Therefore, Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows an amendment to relate back if “the 
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the 
original pleading.”68 By allowing a plaintiff to amend the complaint to 
clarify the claim or modify the facts alleged, this rule ensures the pleading 
is able to serve its purpose of bringing the “real issues of the case” before 
the court.69 
The requirement that the defendant had notice of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence underlying the claim is also sufficient to ensure 
that the policies behind the statute of limitations are satisfied.70 
By filing the original complaint, the plaintiff places the defendant on 
notice that the plaintiff is trying to enforce a claim arising out of the alleged 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id.; accord Staren v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 
1976). 
 63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1497 (“The fact that an amendment changes the 
legal theory on which the action initially was brought is of no consequence if the factual 
situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to 
defendant’s attention by the original pleading.”). 
 66. Zagurski v. Am. Tobacco Co., 44 F.R.D. 440, 442 (D. Conn. 1967). 
 67. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (“The 
amendment ‘merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in support of the cause of 
action already asserted . . . and was not affected by the intervening lapse of time.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 293 (1916))). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
 69. 2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.02. 
 70. Zagurski, 44 F.R.D. at 442-43. 
2013]       COMMENTS 123 
 
 
transaction, and therefore “[i]t is not unreasonable to require [the 
defendant] to anticipate all theories of recovery and prepare its defense 
accordingly.”71 Requiring notice in this way avoids prejudice to the 
defendant. At the same time, the rule furthers the statute of limitations 
policy of precluding claims by plaintiffs “who have sat on their rights,”72 
because any claims allowed under the rule were encompassed by the 
transactionally related facts in the original complaint.73 
2. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) 
While Rule 15(c)(1)(B) addresses amendments to claims, Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) deals with changing parties.74 Specifically, the rule allows 
amendments adding or changing defendants to relate back when certain 
conditions are met.75 While the amendment must satisfy the 15(c)(1)(B) 
requirement that it asserts a claim or defense arising out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) 
imposes two additional requirements.76 First, the new defendant must have 
had “such notice [of the institution] of the action that [he] will not be 
prejudiced in defending on the merits.”77 Second, the new defendant must 
have known, or should have known, that he would have been named 
originally if not for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.78 
By allowing misnomers and mistakes to be corrected, even once the 
statute of limitations has run, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) ensures that meritorious 
claims will not be dismissed on technical pleading errors.79 However, the 
rule effectively addresses statute of limitations considerations as well, as 
the two requirements it imposes for adding parties speak directly to the two 
policies underlying statutes of limitations.80 Assuming the amendment 
states a claim that is transactionally related to the pleading, Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back when: (1) notice was provided so as not to 
prejudice the new party from defending on the merits, and (2) the new party 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 443. 
 72. See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 73. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
 74. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), with id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 
 75. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80. Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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“knew or should have known” that it would have been included initially, if 
not for a mistake of identity.81 
First, the two requirements of the rule ensure that the defendant has not 
been prejudiced by the delay of an untimely claim.82 As the Northern 
District of Illinois pointed out in Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, if the 
new defendant “was aware all along that it would have been named in the 
original complaint but for a mistake, then it is fair to say that the newly 
added party had a real opportunity (and reason) to begin a defense even 
though not originally named in the lawsuit.”83 When both requirements of 
the rule are met, the newly added party has notice that a claim is being 
asserted against it. 
Second, the “mistake of identity” requirement in 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) protects 
defendants’ interests in repose by ensuring that plaintiffs have not sat on 
their rights.84 While the exact nature of what constitutes a “mistake” has 
been a subject of much debate,85 the Supreme Court has directly stated that 
the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requirements are not met unless a mistake of identity 
occurs.86 The mistake requirement limits the relation back of amendments 
adding defendants to those cases where the plaintiff believed he or she had 
filed a timely lawsuit against the proper party.87 Thus, the requirement 
obliges plaintiffs to bring their suits in a timely fashion whenever they are 
able, while preventing tardy plaintiffs from using relation back as an avenue 
for springing untimely suits on unsuspecting defendants.88 As the First 
Circuit noted, “[p]roperly construed, [Rule 15(c)(1)(C)] allows some claims 
that otherwise might be dismissed on the basis of procedural technicalities 
                                                                                                                 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
 82. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1014; see also Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 
1974). 
 83. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 84. Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (“The 
requirement to demonstrate a mistake . . . is concerned with protecting a defendant’s interest 
in repose where a dilatory complainant has simply sat on his or her rights . . . .”). 
 85. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2492 & n.2 (2010) 
(collecting cases summarizing the “tension among the Circuits” on the issue). 
 86. Id. at 2496 (stating that the Rule 15(c) requirements are not met when “the failure to 
name the prospective defendant in the original complaint was the result of a fully informed 
decision as opposed to a mistake concerning the proper defendant’s identity”); see also 
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 467 n.1 (2000). 
 87. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 88. See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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to prosper while at the same time keeping the door closed to other claims 
that have been allowed to wither on the vine.”89 
E. Applying Relation Back to Amendments Adding Plaintiffs 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does not expressly cover amendments adding plaintiffs. 
The text of the rule refers only to amendments changing “the party against 
whom a claim is asserted”—that is, defendants.90 However, the 
accompanying Advisory Committee Notes state that “the attitude taken in 
revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to 
amendments changing plaintiffs.”91 Therefore, most courts have approached 
this problem by attempting to ascertain in what form the rule should be 
applied to plaintiffs.92 
The “attitude” taken in Rule 15(c) is a nuanced approach that carefully 
balances the conflicting policies behind the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure with the policies behind statutes of limitations.93 The rule not 
only avoids prejudice to defendants, it also protects defendants’ “strong 
interest in repose” except in cases where defendants are aware they have 
avoided liability only because of a mistake.94 More fundamentally, by 
imposing the mistake requirement, the rule respects statutes of limitations 
by limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiff did not sit on his 
rights, but legitimately asserted or attempted to assert the claim in the 
original complaint.95 Thus, a truly effective application of the rule to 
plaintiffs will not focus merely on prejudice to the defendant. It will also 
impose some standard to restrict relation back to those instances where the 
plaintiff to be brought in by amendment asserted or attempted to assert a 
claim in the original complaint. 
Three primary approaches have developed among the federal circuits 
regarding how to apply the “attitude” of Rule 15(c) to amendments seeking 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Young v. Lepone, 305 F. 3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (emphasis added). 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 92. See 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND 
COMMENTARY, 315 nn.178-81 (2012) (collecting cases). But see Newell v. Harrison, 779 F. 
Supp. 388, 392 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that the plain language of Rule 15(c) does not apply 
to amendments changing or adding plaintiffs). 
 93. Young, 305 F.3d at 14; Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974). 
 94. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010); Powers v. Graff, 
148 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 
(N.D. Ga. 1992)). 
 95. Wells, 813 F. Supp. at 1566 (“Rule 15(c) serves to ensure that amendments relate 
back only if the original pleading gave adequate notice of the subject of the amendment.”). 
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to add untimely plaintiffs.96 This comment examines the legal and policy 
ramifications of each of these approaches, determining how well each 
balances the conflicting policies underlying relation back. 
II. The Three Approaches Taken by Courts 
A. The Literal Approach Requiring Mistake of Identity 
Some courts have adopted a “literal approach” that applies all the literal 
requirements of Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs.97 Rule 15(c)(1) states: 
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when: 
A. the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations 
allows relation back; 
B. the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading; or 
C. the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 
party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 
15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided 
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, 
the party to be brought in by amendment: 
i. received such notice of the action that it will not 
be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and  
ii. knew or should have known that the action would 
have been brought against it, but for a mistake 
concerning the proper party’s identity.98 
Courts using this approach consider the threshold issue of whether the 
new claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the 
original claim.99 Then, as the text of Rule 15(c) prohibits the addition of 
new parties unless there was a mistake concerning their identities,100 the 
plaintiff must show that the defendants knew or should have known that 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Plummer v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315-16 (E.D. Okla. 
2005). 
 97. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036 , 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1). 
 99. See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
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“but for a mistake, they would have been sued directly by these 
plaintiffs.”101 The mistake requirement makes this approach quite 
restrictive. 
The Third Circuit articulated this approach in Nelson v. County of 
Allegheny.102 In Nelson, a group of women had been arrested during a 
protest and subsequently filed a suit alleging civil rights violations.103 More 
than two years after the statute of limitations had run, an amended 
complaint attempted to add two additional protestors as party plaintiffs.104 
The court stated that “for the [plaintiffs’] claims to relate back, all three 
conditions specified in Rule 15(c)(3) must be satisfied.”105 Because the new 
plaintiffs’ allegations were transactionally related to the original pleading 
and the evidence overlapped, there was no prejudice to the defendant.106 
However, the court went on to hold that the amendment did not relate back 
because the plaintiffs did “not demonstrate[] ‘a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party.’”107 Rather, the plaintiffs “sat on their rights” 
and then “[sought] to take advantage of the rule to perform an end-run 
around the statute of limitations.”108 The court recognized that the mistake 
requirement places appropriate limits on relation back and screens out such 
late-coming plaintiffs by “requir[ing] plaintiffs to show that the already 
commenced action sufficiently embraces the amended claims so that 
defendants are not unfairly prejudiced by these late-coming plaintiffs and 
that plaintiffs have not slept on their rights.”109 Thus, the court determined 
that to respect the statute of limitations, it must apply the relation back rule 
as written.110 Courts in the Third Circuit have embraced this approach,111 
while other courts have at least considered lack of mistake as a factor in 
declining to allow relation back.112 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015. 
 102. See id. at 1011-15. 
 103. Id. at 1011. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1014. 
 106. Id. at 1015. 
 107. Id. at 1014 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)). 
 108. Id. at 1015. 
 109. Id. at 1014. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 
2005). 
 112. See, e.g., Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 
2010) (holding plaintiffs were not attempting to correct a misnomer or substitute the real 
party in interest, but instead were “attempt[ing] to circumvent the statute of limitations, 
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Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a “mistake of identity” limits the 
addition of new parties to those situations where there is a valid pleading 
error, ensuring that tardy plaintiffs are not able to use relation back rules to 
join a lawsuit when there is no legitimate pleading error to correct.113 If an 
error has been made in the naming of one of the plaintiffs, the statute of 
limitations will not bar a plaintiff from correcting this error. However, one 
problem with applying the literal text to plaintiffs is that it is difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which the plaintiff was mistaken about its own 
identity. The most likely situation to arise is one in which the plaintiff was 
actually mistaken about his or her right to bring the suit. For example, one 
subsidiary corporation might bring a lawsuit when technically the right to 
bring the suit belonged to a parent corporation or a sister subsidiary. 
In Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Third Circuit held 
that such a case would be more appropriately dealt with under Rule 17, 
which allows for the joinder of the real party in interest.114 Rule 17 states 
that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest”115 and allows the real party in interest an opportunity “to ratify, 
join or be substituted in the action.”116 Thus, when there was a mistake 
about who had the right to bring the lawsuit, Rule 17 allows plaintiffs to 
join a suit after the limitations period has passed.117 Therefore, applying 
Rule 15(c) to amendments adding plaintiffs is redundant if showing a 
“mistake of identity” would only apply to situations where the real party in 
interest is being substituted in the case. Such cases would indeed be more 
appropriately dealt with under Rule 17. 
However, Rule 17 may not be sufficiently broad to render Rule 15(c) 
useless as applied to all plaintiffs. For instance, if the original plaintiff in 
the suit is a real party in interest, Rule 17 will not allow for the addition of 
                                                                                                                 
adding new parties and new claims”); Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (requiring mistake concerning identity of proper plaintiff). 
 113. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015; see also 1 GENSLER, supra note 92, at 315 (“Faithfully 
policing these requirements ensures that dilatory plaintiffs are not able to evade limitations 
periods by the expedient of joining with timely claimants and then seeking relation back.”). 
 114. 544 F.3d 553, 562 (3d Cir. 2008). In Gardner, the Third Circuit refused to apply 
relation back to an amendment seeking to add a plaintiff, pointing out that the rule text 
applies to defendants, and that the rule “extend[ed] [only] by analogy to . . . plaintiffs.” Id. at 
561-62 (second alteration in original). Instead, the court declared that Rule 17 was “more 
applicable,” and then refused to allow relation back under that theory. Id. at 562. 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). 
 116. Gardner, 544 F.3d at 562. 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3) (“After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action 
proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.”). 
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other plaintiffs. The Advisory Committee Note discussing relation back of 
amendments adding plaintiffs mentions that Rule 17 is also relevant, but 
primarily directs courts toward Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance.118 Therefore, 
there may be other scenarios where justice would require an untimely 
plaintiff other than the real party in interest to be added as a plaintiff under 
Rule 15(c). If so, we must determine how to adapt the careful requirements 
of Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs to reach a functionally similar result. 
B. The Liberal Notice-Based Approach 
Recognizing that “mechanically applying the mistake requirement to the 
addition of a new plaintiff would make little sense,” other courts have 
abandoned the literal text of the rule in favor of a notice-based approach.119 
Courts taking this approach reason that the policies behind statutes of 
limitations are upheld if the addition of the new plaintiff does not prejudice 
the defendant.120 Therefore, when applying Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs, these 
courts allow relation back if the complaint provided the defendant with 
notice sufficient to avoid prejudice.121 While some courts require a shared 
identity of interest between the old and new plaintiffs to establish sufficient 
notice, other courts consider the standard to be met any time the claims of 
the old and new plaintiffs arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence. 
1. Identity of Interest to Avoid Prejudice 
In Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, the Northern District of Illinois 
rejected a literal application of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) to amendments adding 
plaintiffs.122 The court reasoned that because the rule was intended to 
govern amendments adding defendants, its requirements must be adapted in 
order to meaningfully apply the rule to amendments adding plaintiffs.123 To 
this end, the court examined the rule, noting that the mistake requirement 
“helps ensure that the newly added party—who was not originally a 
defendant in the case—in fact had timely notice that it was the real target of 
the allegations.”124 The court reasoned that when applying the rule to 
plaintiffs, the analogous concern was ensuring that the defendant was aware 
                                                                                                                 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 119. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 1041-44. 
 121. See id. at 1045. 
 122. Id. at 1043. 
 123. Id. at 1041-42. 
 124. Id. at 1043. 
130 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:113 
 
 
of “the possibility that other plaintiffs might assert claims arising from 
the . . . conduct” described in the original pleading.125 Thus, the court 
focused on determining whether the defendant had fair “notice that it might 
have to defend a claim brought by the new plaintiff,” and whether the 
defendant suffered any actual prejudice, such as the loss of evidence due to 
the passage of time.126 In addition to requiring that the new “claim [arose] 
out of the same transaction, conduct or occurrence alleged in the original 
complaint,” the court also considered whether an identity of interest existed 
between the two plaintiffs, “so close that a court can conclude that a 
defendant had notice of a new party’s potential claims and thus would not 
suffer any prejudice by the party’s addition.”127 
The Seventh Circuit used a similar analysis in Staren v. American 
National Bank & Trust Co., allowing a corporation to be substituted as 
plaintiff, where the original plaintiffs were the individual owners of the 
corporation.128 The court focused primarily on the fact that the claims 
asserted by the parties were transactionally related, stating that “[t]he 
emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether the amended 
complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.”129 The court went on to 
observe that because the substituted and original plaintiffs had an identity 
of interest, the defendant had such notice that no prejudice would result.130 
This approach is founded on the premise “that notice is the critical 
element involved in Rule 15(c) determinations.”131 However, courts taking 
this position fail to recognize that an absence of prejudice only partially 
satisfies the statute of limitations policies.132 Even when a defendant is 
aware of the potential claims that other plaintiffs might assert, once the 
limitations period has passed without an actual lawsuit being asserted, the 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 1043-44. 
 126. Id. at 1045. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 529 F.2d 1257, 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 129. Id. at 1263. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1998) (“‘A potential defendant 
who has not been named in a lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is entitled 
to repose . . . .’” (quoting Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); 
Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (“Rule 15(c) plainly 
provides that potential defendants are entitled to repose after a certain period unless they 
know they have escaped suit only by mistake.”). 
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defendant is entitled to repose.133 Thus, to ensure that the defendant is not 
being deprived of repose simply because a plaintiff has sat on his rights, 
relation back must be limited to exclude such late-coming plaintiffs.134 
When considering amendments that add new plaintiffs, courts cannot 
properly declare that notice is the only critical element to be considered.135 
Rather, a court should consider whether invoking the statute of limitations 
would unjustly prevent a party who had attempted to assert a claim from 
asserting it, or whether the statue is being properly used to prevent an 
untimely plaintiff from joining an action.136 Other courts have flatly 
rejected the notion that transactional relatedness combined with notice is 
sufficient to satisfy the statute of limitations.137 
In Olech, the court attempted to explain the rationale of the notice-based 
approach, first noting “that when the question is adding a party plaintiff 
rather than a party defendant, it is not the explicit requirements of Rule 
15(c) that govern but rather the ‘attitude’ of Rule 15(c).”138 The court, 
however, went on to proclaim that “the attitude that animates the rule is to 
liberally permit amendment of pleadings in order to facilitate decisions on 
the merits, so long as that can be done without sacrificing ‘essential 
fairness’ to defendants.”139 In so doing, the court wrongly identified the 
attitude of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). While the rules generally do liberally permit 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Wells, 813 F. Supp. at 1567. 
 134. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[W]hen it comes 
to a late effort to introduce a new party, something else is added. Not only must the 
adversary have had notice about the operational facts, but it must have had fair notice that a 
legal claim existed in and was in effect being asserted by, the party belatedly brought in.”). 
 135. It has become axiomatic that notice is the primary consideration in Rule 15(c)(1)(B) 
determinations. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Thus, some courts recite the 
principle in Rule 15(c)(1)(C) cases as well, failing to recognize the distinctions between the 
respective rules. See, e.g., Williams, 405 F. 2d at 238 (“Clearly notice is the critical element 
involved in Rule 15(c) determinations.”). 
 136. See Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (“‘In 
deciding whether an amendment relates back to the original claim, notice to the opposing 
party of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff is the critical element.’” (quoting 
Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1984))). 
 137. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002); Pappion v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-82 (W.D. La. 1986) (“The policy for statutes of 
limitations would be circumvented if a plaintiff is allowed to amend his complaint and add a 
new plaintiff merely because the new plaintiff’s claim arose from the same transaction or 
occurrence of the original claim and the defendant was aware that the new plaintiff 
existed.”). 
 138. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 139. Id. 
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amendments, the attitude taken toward relation back of amendments 
changing defendants is a restrained approach that respects statutes of 
limitations by limiting relation back to situations where it is necessary to 
correct a mistake by the plaintiff.140 An application of the rule to plaintiffs 
requires similar restraint. Otherwise, late-coming plaintiffs are able to take 
advantage of relation back simply to circumvent the statute of limitations, 
and, as a result, defendants are denied both the use of the limitations 
defense and their interest in repose.141 
2. The Transactional Test 
Evolving Seventh Circuit jurisprudence has imposed few restrictions on 
relation back of amendments adding new plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit 
allows claims by new plaintiffs to relate back as long as they are 
transactionally related to the claim set out in the pleading.142 This broad and 
permissive approach could allow an individual claim to become a class 
action by amendment long after the statute of limitations has run. 
In Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower 
court ruling allowing an amendment adding class plaintiffs in a Title VII 
case to relate back to a filing by a similarly situated individual.143 In 
determining the proper requirements for relation back of such amendments, 
the trial court addressed only the issue of prejudice, completely ignoring the 
other considerations involved in statutes of limitations.144 While the trial 
court “note[d] that it is rare that an amendment will relate back which adds 
plaintiffs who are total strangers to the lawsuit,” the court did not impose 
any standard to promote this principle, such as requiring some degree of 
privity between the original and additional plaintiffs.145 The court only 
required the plaintiff to show that the defendant had not been prejudiced by 
lack of notice.146 Because “Title VII is primarily designed to eradicate 
discrimination of a class-wide character,” the trial court concluded that the 
filing of a Title VII complaint was sufficient to place the defendant on 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010); see also supra Part 
I.D. 
 141. See Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 2005). 
 142. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 143. 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
 144. See Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 494 F. Supp. 687, 689 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“The 
primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect parties from the prejudice caused by 
the loss of evidence due to the passage of time.”), aff’d, 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
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notice of “class-based” claims.147 Furthermore, because the claims involved 
the same evidence, the defendant was not prejudiced by loss of evidence.148 
Thus, the amendment was allowed to relate back.149 In a per curiam 
opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating 
simply that relation back was proper because the class claims arose from 
the same practices as the plaintiff’s original, individual claim.150 
In Arreola v. Godinez, the Seventh Circuit went even further, explicitly 
holding that amendments adding new plaintiffs relate back as long as the 
claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence set out in the original 
pleading.151 Rule 15(c)(1)(B) provides that an amended pleading relates 
back when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in 
the original pleading.”152 This rule is usually understood to allow 
amendments to add new claims or defenses that are transactionally related 
to that in the original pleading, or to assert new legal theories.153 However, 
the Seventh Circuit held that because the amendment adding new plaintiffs 
included a claim that was transactionally related to the original pleading, 
Rule 15(c)(1)(B) would govern, and would allow relation back.154 In a 
cursory analysis, the court noted that because the amendment did not seek 
to add a new defendant, “there [was] no problem under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C).”155 
Such a reading of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) would apparently allow for any 
changes to the pleading, so long as the amendment also asserts a claim 
transactionally related to the original pleading. However, this cannot be the 
intended reading of the rule. If it were, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) would be 
unnecessary, as the changes it authorizes would be allowed under Rule 
15(c)(1)(B).156 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 
amendment specify that “the attitude . . . toward change of defendants 
extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs,” clearly directing 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 690. 
 150. Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
 151. 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
 153. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 516 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
 154. Arreola, 546 F.3d at 796. 
 155. Id. 
 156. One of the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is “if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
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courts toward Rule 15(c)(1)(C).157 The Seventh Circuit application of Rule 
15(c)(1)(B) to this issue leaves the door open for any number of plaintiffs 
who are strangers to a case to join pending actions long after the statute of 
limitations has passed. Other courts have “flatly reject[ed] the proposition 
that relation back is available merely because a new plaintiff’s claims arise 
from the same transaction or occurrence as the original plaintiff’s 
claims.”158 The First Circuit aptly points out that an action filed by one 
plaintiff does not give “a defendant notice of the impending joinder of any 
or all similarly situated plaintiffs.”159 
The Seventh Circuit’s relation back doctrine is grounded on the faulty 
logic that because courts are encouraged to liberally allow parties to amend 
their pleadings, those amendments should also relate back liberally. The 
court does not consider that the expansive use of relation back rules for 
amendments adding time-barred plaintiffs is contrary to the underlying 
purpose of the rules—the adjudication of conflicts on their merits. Relation 
back generally promotes that goal, preventing the dismissal of meritorious 
claims on technicalities by allowing for the correction of inconsequential 
pleading errors.160 However, by liberally construing relation back, the 
Seventh Circuit allows unmeritorious (time-barred) claims to be added on a 
technicality. To best promote adjudication of conflicts on their merits, 
claims adding parties should relate back only under the narrow 
circumstances contemplated in Rule 15(c)(1)(C): when a party seeks to 
clarify a pleading by adding another person or entity who is clearly 
implicated in the lawsuit, but would otherwise be barred from making the 
correction by the statute of limitations. 
C. The Involvement Approach 
1. Application of the Involvement Standard 
Recognizing both the importance of limiting potential plaintiffs and the 
problems with applying the mistake of identity requirement to plaintiffs, 
some courts have forged a third approach.161 This approach rejects the 
notion that the mere absence of prejudice is sufficient to uphold the policies 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. Rule 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 158. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 159. Id. at 15. 
 160. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010). 
 161. See, e.g., Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Plummer v. Farmers 
Grp., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (E.D. Okla. 2005) (discussing the literal and notice-
based approaches and noting the limitations of each). 
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behind the statute of limitations.162 Instead, it requires that defendants have 
notice not only of the existence of potential plaintiffs, but also of their 
involvement in the litigation.163 Courts have generally recognized notice of 
the new plaintiff’s involvement when an identity of interest exists between 
the original and the new plaintiffs, or when the defendant knew or should 
have known that other plaintiffs were attempting to assert claims.164 If 
applied properly, this approach has the advantage of limiting relation back 
to those situations where the new plaintiff was asserting or attempting to 
assert the claims in the original complaint. 
The Fifth Circuit formulated this approach in Williams v. United States, 
one of the first cases to test the application of the 1966 amendment to Rule 
15(c) to plaintiffs.165 In Williams, a mother had asserted a claim as next 
friend of her injured minor child.166 After the statute of limitations had run, 
the mother sought to amend the complaint to add herself as a party plaintiff 
and recover for loss of services, as allowed by state law.167 The court 
recognized that relation back of amendments adding parties demands 
special consideration of the purpose behind the statute of limitations, noting 
that the analysis must go beyond a mere question of notice.168 Conceding 
that “notice is the critical element” in determining whether a claim should 
relate back, the court observed that when considering the relation back of 
amendments adding plaintiffs, “something else is added.”169 “Not only must 
the adversary have had notice about the operational facts, but it must have 
had fair notice that a legal claim existed in and was in effect being asserted 
by, the party belatedly brought in.”170 The court held that a liberal reading 
of the complaint “clearly revealed the existence of (a) a minor (b) the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See, e.g., Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309 (“Even if, as here, there were no showing of 
specific prejudice in the sense of lost or destroyed evidence, defendants would still be 
deprived of their interest in repose.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text. 
 165. 405 F.2d at 236-39. 
 166. Id. at 235. A “next friend” is “[a] person who appears in a lawsuit to act for the 
benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not 
appointed as a guardian.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (9th ed. 2009). 
 167. Williams, 405 F.2d at 235. 
 168. Id. at 237 (“[S]uch an addition amounts to the assertion of a ‘new cause of action,’ 
and if an amendment were allowed to relate back in that situation, the purpose of the statute 
of limitation would be defeated.”). 
 169. Id. at 236, 238. 
 170. Id. at 238. 
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mother as parent and (c) the assertion by her of a claim.”171 The defendant 
knew of her involvement in the case as the child’s next friend, and therefore 
an amendment allowing her to assert a claim in her own right was allowed 
to relate back.172 The plaintiff’s amendment in Williams has been 
characterized as “merely a change in capacity,” where “the defendant must 
have known of the existence of the plaintiff’s other capacity.”173 This 
approach to Rule 15(c) allows relation back for plaintiffs who were actually 
involved in the case, albeit informally, while prohibiting the addition of 
strangers who could have been involved but instead sat on their rights. 
The D.C. Circuit applied this standard in Leachman v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., refusing to allow relation back for a corporation wholly owned by an 
existing plaintiff.174 Considering how to adapt Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s mistake 
of identity requirement to a situation involving additional plaintiffs, the 
court reasoned that “[t]he touchstone . . . is whether the defendant knew or 
should have known of the existence and involvement of the new 
plaintiff.”175 In adopting this standard, the court emphasized the need for 
limits to prevent “total strangers” from joining actions, “caus[ing] 
defendants’ liability to increase geometrically and their defensive strategy 
to become far more complex long after the statute of limitations had run.”176 
The court reasoned that even if the defendant had known of the plaintiff’s 
ownership of the corporation, it would not have known of the corporation’s 
potential involvement in the case.177 Thus, the corporation’s claim against 
the defendant “was simply a new cause of action” brought by an untimely 
claimant.178 Therefore, although “there [was] no showing of specific 
prejudice in the sense of lost or destroyed evidence,” the court refused to 
allow relation back.179 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. at 239 (“Since liability to the minor would give rise to a liability to the parent 
under local law, and since the circumstances of these individuals was such as would 
reasonably indicate a likelihood that the parent would incur losses of a recoverable kind, the 
Government was put on notice that the parent’s claim was also involved.” (footnote 
omitted)). The Williams court noted that the outcome “might have been different if the next 
friend . . . had been a nonrelated person, such as a corporate fiduciary.” Id. at 239 n.13. 
 172. Id. at 239. 
 173. Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(discussing Williams, 405 F.2d 234). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1310. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1309-10. 
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This application of identity of interest permits relation back of new 
plaintiffs under a much narrower set of circumstances than the Olech 
standard.180 Under Leachman, an amendment relates back when the “new” 
plaintiff had actually been involved in the suit “from an early stage.”181 
However, under Olech, an amendment relates back when the defendant had 
notice even of the new party’s potential claims.182 
As an individual complaint probably does not place a potential defendant 
on notice of the actual assertion of class-wide claims or the actual 
involvement of members of a putative class, amendments adding class 
plaintiffs are not likely to relate back under the Leachman approach. The 
Western District of Michigan held that an individual complaint did not 
“place[] [the] defendant on notice that it could be called to answer for the 
extensive class allegations in the amended pleading.”183 Likewise, the Sixth 
Circuit, applying the Tennessee state law identity of interest standard, found 
no identity of interest when the original complaint and the amended class-
wide allegations were identical.184 
Identity of interest may not be the only way to establish notice of 
involvement. Some courts have also recognized such notice where “the 
original complaint on its face reveals the existence of additional claimants,” 
which, “possibly in combination with some conduct by plaintiffs or the 
defendant, justifies an inference that the new claimants were in fact 
‘involved’ in the action.”185 For example, in Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 
the original complaint made clear that the plaintiff intended “to name and 
certify a class action within 60 days before trial.”186 The court allowed 
relation back on the theory that the timely-filed “complaint provided the 
defendants with adequate notice that a class action was contemplated and 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Compare id., with Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000). 
 181. Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309 (quoting 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 15.15 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. Olech, 138 F. Supp. 2d. at 1045. 
 183. Peralta v. Accept Acceptance, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-1270, 2009 WL 723910, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2009). 
 184. Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 185. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 512 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing 
Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)); see also Sokolski v. Trans 
Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing relation back of 
amendment adding class plaintiffs where original complaint requested that plaintiff be 
granted leave to amend and certify a class action, and alleged that the defendant intended “to 
deceive plaintiff and ‘others’”). 
 186. 178 F.R.D. at 398. 
138 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:113 
 
 
would be sought.”187 Likewise, in Soler v. G & U, Inc., the Southern 
District of New York found that notice of involvement was satisfied when 
language in the complaint explicitly referred to new plaintiffs, combined 
with the fact that the prospective plaintiffs had filed consent to sue forms.188 
2. Potential Misapplication of the Notice of Involvement Standard 
To uphold the statute of limitations policies, the notice of involvement 
standard must be applied properly. However, three particular areas pose a 
risk for misapplication of the standard. One danger is that courts will 
consider references to the existence of the potential plaintiffs in the 
complaint sufficient to satisfy the requirements of dual notice, when such 
references clearly do not accomplish this goal.189 Page v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. illustrates the care courts must take in separating the actual 
involvement of potential plaintiffs from obvious references to their 
existence in the complaint.190 In Page, an individual plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant “fail[ed] to guarantee and pay benefits to her and other 
members of her pension plan.”191 The complaint made references to 
“‘plaintiff and other members of the class’” and “‘other individuals 
similarly situated.’”192 The plaintiff later sought to add as plaintiffs “a 
proposed nationwide class of indeterminate size,” arguing that the 
complaint was, on its face, “an obvious omnibus challenge on behalf of 
every allegedly wronged pensioner.”193 The court rejected this argument, 
holding that even these explicit references to the potential class were not 
sufficient to provide notice of the class members’ involvement in the 
case.194 The court emphasized that to allow such statements to satisfy the 
requirement would effectively reduce the standard to a transactional test.195 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. at 398-99. 
 188. 103 F.R.D. 69, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 189. See Page, 130 F.R.D. at 511-12 (holding that references in the complaint to “‘other 
individuals similarly situated’” did not provide notice of those individuals’ involvement). 
 190. See id. at 512-13. 
 191. Id. at 511. 
 192. Id. at 511-12. 
 193. Id. at 511, 513. 
 194. Id. at 513 (“The Court rejects the idea, advanced by plaintiff, that a declaratory 
judgment action by a limited group necessarily puts a defendant on notice that it may be 
engaged in litigation with nationwide implications.”). 
 195. Id. (characterizing plaintiff’s argument as “another way of saying that where a new 
plaintiff’s claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, and nothing more, relation 
back should obtain”). The Page court went on to allow a limited class of plaintiffs to relate 
back on other grounds. Id. 
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Thus, a reference in the complaint to other parties who may have potential 
claims is insufficient to establish their involvement in the case.196 One 
possible exception may be when the original plaintiff has the capacity to 
sue on behalf of the new plaintiff. For example, as determined in Williams 
v. United States, when claims are asserted by a parent or guardian on behalf 
of a minor child, the defendant would be aware of the individual claims of 
the parent or guardian arising from the same transaction.197  
To understand how “capacity to sue” can play a critical role, contrast 
Williams with LeMasters v. K-Mart, Inc., a case which appears to contain 
similar facts but where the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue on behalf of the 
new plaintiff.198 In LeMasters, the plaintiff’s wife had witnessed the 
accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury claim.199 The defendant had 
notice of these facts “minutes after the accident,” as evidenced by the 
accident report.200 Seeking to amend the complaint to add the wife as a 
plaintiff claiming loss of consortium, the plaintiff argued that, under 
Williams, the amendment should relate back because it was clear that the 
plaintiff had a wife, and that the defendant was on notice that she had a 
potential claim for loss of consortium.201 However, the court refused to 
allow relation back, reasoning that the fact that the plaintiff had a wife did 
not imply that she had a claim for loss of consortium.202  
In Williams, the mother was in a unique situation because she had the 
capacity to assert claims both in her own right and as her child’s next 
friend.203 Although she first brought the lawsuit on behalf of the child, the 
defendant was aware of her “involvement” in the case, as well as her 
existence.204 In LeMasters, on the other hand, the plaintiff had no capacity 
to assert a claim on behalf of his wife.205 Absent some affirmative action by 
the wife to show her involvement in the case, the defendant had no reason 
to suspect that she was or would be asserting claims.206 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See id. at 511-12. 
 197. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 198. Compare id., with LeMasters v. K-Mart, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (E.D. La. 
1989). 
 199. LeMasters, 712 F. Supp. at 520. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Williams, 405 F.2d at 235. 
 204. Id. at 239. 
 205. LeMasters, 712 F. Supp. at 520. 
 206. Id. 
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A second danger of misapplication is in the way courts interpret the new 
plaintiff’s involvement. For example, in Andujar v. Rogowski, four 
individuals initiated a lawsuit, filing a complaint that described an incident 
involving “‘plaintiffs, along with other workers.’”207 An amendment adding 
three additional individuals was allowed to relate back based primarily on 
the fact that one of the defendants had “participated in settlement 
negotiations that involved demands made on behalf of [the new 
plaintiffs].”208 The court reasoned that those demands, combined with the 
statements in the complaint, placed the defendants on actual notice “of the 
existence of other potential claims outstanding.”209 
The danger here lies in the fact that settlement negotiations with a 
potential plaintiff place a defendant only on notice that a claim exists, not 
that such a claim will necessarily be asserted. Under ordinary 
circumstances, a plaintiff must file a lawsuit within the limitations period. 
The fact that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations prior to the 
running of the limitations period does not allow a tardy would-be plaintiff 
to escape the limitations bar.210 As the Sixth Circuit has observed, “a 
defendant does not waive a statute of limitations defense merely by 
engaging in settlement negotiations with a plaintiff.”211 Likewise, when one 
plaintiff has filed a suit, the fact that a defendant engages in settlement 
negotiations with a second potential plaintiff should not waive the 
defendant’s limitations defense as to the second plaintiff. Absent an express 
reference to the imminent addition of new plaintiffs in the complaint, 
settlement negotiations give no indication that a party to the negotiations 
was attempting to assert a legal claim in a pending lawsuit.212 
Again, a possible exception could be when the original plaintiff has the 
capacity to assert claims on behalf of the new plaintiff. For example, if a 
trustee asserts a claim arising out of a conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
that would also give rise to a claim by the trustee’s beneficiary, and in 
settlement negotiations the trustee makes demands on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                 
 207. 113 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 289 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 
Simpson v. Jack Baker, Inc., 620 A.2d 254, 255 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam) (declining to toll 
the statute of limitations where plaintiff, “in hopes of settlement, . . . failed to file suit prior 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations”). 
 211. Michals, 289 F.3d at 409. 
 212. See Raziano v. United States, 999 F.2d 1539, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (declining to 
toll the statute of limitations where settlement negotiations placed the defendant on notice 
that the claim might be pursued in court). 
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beneficiary, it is possible that the defendant is on notice that the trustee is 
attempting to assert a claim on behalf of the beneficiary. Under this 
analysis, settlement negotiations undertaken on behalf of a class would 
constitute “involvement” of the class only when the class had been 
certified, giving the negotiator capacity to assert claims on behalf of the 
new class plaintiffs.213 
A third potential for misapplication arises from confusion created by 
courts purporting to apply an “identity of interest” test. While some courts 
following the Leachman and Williams approach apply an “identity of 
interest” test as a standard for determining when a defendant should have 
had notice of a potential plaintiff’s involvement,214 the term is problematic 
because of its widespread use in other contexts. To satisfy the “existence 
and involvement” requirement articulated in Williams, courts usually 
require a “legal or familial relationship” to establish identity of interest.215 
However, courts applying a liberal approach focused on notice use an 
“identity of interest” test to determine whether the defendant had notice 
sufficient to avoid prejudice.216 Under this much broader standard, even a 
putative class may have a sufficient “identity of interest” with a similarly 
situated individual to allow for relation back.217 
Rather than examine identities of interest, a more precise inquiry for 
determining involvement may be whether the original plaintiff had the 
capacity to assert representative claims on behalf of the new plaintiff.218 
                                                                                                                 
 213. But see Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990). 
After holding that references to the existence of additional potential plaintiffs in the 
complaint were not enough to permit relation back, the Page court allowed a limited class of 
plaintiffs to relate back. Id. at 512-13. Because the defendant had engaged in “settlement 
negotiations on a nationwide class basis,” the court determined the defendant had recognized 
that the class plaintiffs were involved in the litigation. Id. at 513. Thus, the court granted 
relation back to those members of the class for whom the statute of limitations had not yet 
expired at the time of the settlement negotiations. Id. at 514. The plaintiff did not have the 
capacity to assert claims on behalf of the class members at the time of the negotiations, as 
the class had not yet been certified. See id. at 512-14. However, the court appears to have 
reasoned that because the plaintiff could have gained that capacity through certification, 
notice could be imputed to the defendant. See id. at 514.  
 214. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2002); Pappion v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (W.D. La. 1986). 
 215. See In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (D. Alaska 1990) (noting that 
although not required by the language of Rule 15(c), “a large number of the cases allowing 
relation back under Rule 15(c) do involve legal or familial relationships”). 
 216. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 217. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 218. See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, when the Williams court introduced the use of the “identity of 
interest” test to determine whether notice of a plaintiff’s involvement was 
met, the mother had the capacity to assert claims on her child’s behalf as 
well as her own.219 Under this standard, relation back would also be 
allowed when “the same natural person serves two fiduciary roles,” for 
example, as both personal representative of a decedent’s estate and as 
guardian ad litem of the surviving children.220 When the defendant has 
notice that the original plaintiff had the capacity to sue on behalf of the 
plaintiff to be brought in, and the claims of the new plaintiff are 
transactionally related to the claims in the original complaint, the defendant 
can be said to have notice not only of the existence of the new plaintiff’s 
claims, but also of the actual involvement of the new plaintiff in the suit. 
Involvement requires that the defendant had “adequate notice of the new 
plaintiffs, and that the original suit in effect asserted their claims as 
well.”221 When applied in this way, the involvement requirement functions 
as an effective replacement for the “mistake of identity” requirement, 
limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiffs did not sit on their 
rights, but had reason to believe those rights were being actively asserted, 
either by themselves or by someone with the capacity to do so. 
III. Tenth Circuit Jurisprudence 
A. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
The standard for relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs is not 
settled in the Tenth Circuit. In a recent case, McClelland v. Deluxe 
Financial Services, Inc., the Tenth Circuit considered the question of 
whether an amendment adding class allegations of discrimination would 
relate back to an individual claim based on similar allegations.222 The court 
refused to allow the claim to relate back, based on a determination not only 
that the amendment sought to add new plaintiffs, but also that it included 
“new and separate allegations implicating a wider set of facts, witnesses, 
and proofs.”223 The court applied Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and concluded that the 
“complaint [did] not arise out of the same ‘conduct, transaction, or 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 220. Beal v. City of Seattle, 954 P.2d 237, 242 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
 221. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 222. 431 F. App’x 718, 729-30 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 223. Id. at 730. 
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occurrence set out . . . in the initial pleading,’” and therefore did not relate 
back.224 
Because the plaintiff did not meet the threshold requirement of 
transactional relatedness,225 it is unclear whether the court would have 
applied some form of other requirements under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), or if the 
court would have found transactional relatedness sufficient to allow relation 
back, as the Seventh Circuit has done. 
The court did briefly address the issue of repose, noting that while “a 
potential defendant has a ‘strong interest in repose,’ repose should not be a 
‘windfall’ for a defendant who possesses sufficient notice of impending 
claims.”226 The court went on to focus on whether “sufficient notice” was 
given.227 Thus, for amendments adding plaintiffs to relate back, the Tenth 
Circuit appears to require (1) transactional relatedness, and (2) “sufficient 
notice of impending claims.”228 Although McClelland provides some 
guidance, it remains unclear in the Tenth Circuit what constitutes 
“sufficient notice.” The court expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
Paskuly position that an individual allegation of discrimination was 
“sufficient in and of itself to provide notice” of class-wide discrimination 
claims.229 However, it is unclear whether “sufficient notice” to protect a 
defendant’s interests in repose requires mere notice that related claims by 
additional plaintiffs were possible, as the Seventh Circuit requires, or notice 
both of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff, as Leachman 
demands. 
Because the court was not faced with determining the precise 
requirements for relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs, the court 
did not address whether any kind of limiting requirement, such as “identity 
of interest,” should be imposed. However, because the court was silent on 
the issue, requiring identity of interest would not be inconsistent with 
McClelland. An identity of interest standard would promote the threshold 
requirements of transactional relatedness and notice, while also addressing 
the next step of the analysis. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 224. Id. at 719 (second alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B)).  
 225. See id. at 730. 
 226. Id. at 723 (quoting Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010)). 
 227. Id. at 731-32. 
 228. See id. at 719, 723. 
 229. Id. at 732. 
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B. District Court Opinions 
The district courts within the Tenth Circuit have taken a variety of 
approaches to allowing relation back for new plaintiffs. In American 
Banker’s Insurance Co. v. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc., the District of 
Colorado took an approach similar to that of the Seventh Circuit.230 First, 
the court quoted Rule 15(c), including the mistake of identity 
requirement.231 The court next quoted the 1966 Advisory Committee Note 
providing that the attitude of the rule “extends by analogy to amendments 
changing plaintiffs.”232 Then, the court simply stated that because the 
allegations were “almost identical,” and because there was no apparent 
prejudice to the defendant, the amendment related back.233 The court did 
not undertake any analysis of the requirements listed in Rule 15(c); nor did 
it give any justification for completely eliminating any form of the mistake 
requirement. In so doing, the court reduced the nuanced requirements of 
Rule 15(c) to a simple transactional test. Relying partially on American 
Banker’s, the District of Kansas has also allowed relation back when claims 
were transactionally related and no prejudice was found.234 
The Northern District of Oklahoma used a similar test in United States ex 
rel. Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc.235 In Koch, however, the court relied on a 
Tenth Circuit case from 1951, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All 
American Bus Lines, Inc.,236 to conclude that transactional relatedness 
should be the only requirement.237 The court failed to note that at the time 
American Fidelity was decided, the rules did not specifically provide for 
changing parties at all, as the provision now known as Rule 15(c)(1)(C) was 
not added until 1966.238 In American Fidelity, the court was tasked with 
determining whether the real party in interest could be added to the action 
once the statute of limitations had passed.239 Today, it is generally accepted 
that an amendment adding the real party in interest automatically relates 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See 93 F.R.D. 135, 136-37 (D. Colo. 1982). 
 231. See id. at 136. 
 232. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 233. Id. at 136-37. 
 234. Ottawa Cnty. Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., No. 03-4187-RDR, 
2004 WL 813768, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2004). 
 235. See No. 91-CV-763-B, 1995 WL 812134, at *8 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
 236. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951). 
 237. Koch, 1995 WL 812134, at *8. 
 238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966). 
 239. Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 190 F.2d at 237. 
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back under Rule 17.240 Therefore, although the analysis in American 
Fidelity was correct, it is not analogous to the situation in Koch. 
Furthermore, because Rule 15(c) did not expressly address adding or 
changing parties in 1951, there was no “mistake of identity” requirement in 
the rule at that time.241 However, the requirement was present in the rule at 
the time Koch was decided,242 and the court should have addressed why it 
chose to ignore that requirement. 
In 1994, the District of Colorado again addressed relation back of 
plaintiffs in Ambraziunas v. Bank of Boulder.243 In Ambraziunas, however, 
the court applied the literal approach and refused to allow relation back 
because, although the plaintiffs shared “commonality between their 
claims,” they did not establish “any mistake in the original complaint to 
merit the relation back of the claims.”244 Although the court’s approach in 
this case was contrary to its earlier decision in American Banker’s, the court 
did not refer to American Banker’s or any other Tenth Circuit court’s 
decision.245 
The Eastern District of Oklahoma, in Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 
followed Olech in applying a prejudice-focused identity of interest test.246 
In what appears to be the most extensive analysis of relation back taken by 
any court in the Tenth Circuit, the Plummer court announced a four-factor 
test including an identity of interest requirement, stating that the purpose of 
the test is “to determine whether the Rule 15(c) requirements of fair notice 
and lack of prejudice have been met.”247 
Although the court used the term “identity of interest,” it placed 
emphasis on notice, rather than actual involvement of the plaintiff, resulting 
in an approach that more closely resembles the Seventh Circuit than 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See, e.g., Scheufler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966). 
 242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1966) (amended 1991, 1993). 
 243. See 846 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 244. Id. at 1467. 
 245. The court cited only two sources: In re Integrated Res. Real Estate Ltd. P’ships Sec. 
Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), and 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1501, at 154 (1990). See Ambraziunas, 846 F. Supp. at 1467. 
 246. See 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315-16 (E.D. Okla. 2005). In Plummer, the court 
addressed this issue not in the statute of limitations context, but to decide if an amendment 
“related back” to before the Class Action Fairness Act went into effect. To decide this, the 
court went through the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) analysis as if it applied. Id. 
 247. Id.  
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Williams or other courts using an “existence and involvement” standard.248 
While the court did use notice to limit the class of potential plaintiffs, 
stating that “notice from the initial [individual] complaint . . . cannot serve 
as ‘adequate’ notice of all claims on behalf of all plaintiffs who might 
someday fall with in [sic] the class definition,”249 this approach still appears 
to be much more liberal than the restrictive identity of interest test 
articulated in Williams. Although the court refused to allow relation back 
for plaintiffs who were all victims of the defendant’s alleged actions, it was 
because the claimants had “separate contracts, for separate property, with 
differing monetary value.”250 It is unclear to what extent the court would 
allow untimely amendments for class action plaintiffs with identical claims. 
Thus, it appears that the trend among the district courts in the Tenth 
Circuit is an approach similar to that of the Seventh Circuit. Generally, the 
courts require only transactional relatedness and a lack of prejudice. 
However, with the exception of the Plummer court, none of these courts 
appear to have closely examined the issue. 
IV. The Effect of State Relation Back Law in Federal Court 
In an interesting twist on this issue, federal courts may find themselves 
applying state relation back law in the area where relation back is most 
likely to cause extreme results: the class action context. Assume an 
individual, not having federal jurisdiction for his claim, files a case in state 
court. When the amendment is made to add class plaintiffs, the defendant 
will likely immediately remove to federal court under the Class Action 
Fairness Act.251 If the statute of limitations ran before the amendment was 
filed, the federal court will apply state civil procedure statutes to determine 
if the amendment (which was made in state court) will relate back.252 
Many state rules of civil procedure mirror the federal rules, and therefore 
states often look to the federal courts for guidance on how to apply these 
rules.253 Thus, much of the relevant state law has been influenced by the 
                                                                                                                 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. at 1316 (alterations in original) (quoting Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., No. C05 5404RBL, 2005 WL 1950244, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 250. Id. 
 251. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012). 
 252. See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 395 (6th 
Cir. 2002). 
 253. See Ex parte Novus Utils., Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 996 (Ala. 2011) (“We note that 
federal decisions construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in 
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approaches taken among federal courts.254 A state court, however, is not 
bound by the federal courts in a particular circuit.255 Furthermore, some 
state civil procedure statutes differ significantly from the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.256 In Florida, for example, the state civil procedure statute 
does not specifically allow for relation back when adding new parties.257 
Therefore, the general rule in Florida state court is that relation back is not 
allowed when adding new parties.258 However, the Florida courts have 
constructively allowed such amendments to relate back when sufficient 
“identity of interest” is shown.259 As a result, it is possible that a federal 
court in the Eleventh Circuit—which normally applies a literal, mistake of 
identity approach—might find itself bound to apply an “identity of interest” 
approach when applying Florida state relation back law. Likewise, some 
courts in the Eleventh Circuit might be bound by Alabama law, which deals 
with relation back of plaintiffs exclusively under the state’s version of Rule 
17, which is treated as a “companion rule” to Rule 15260 and thus requires 
                                                                                                                 
construing the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because the Alabama Rules were patterned 
after the Federal Rules.”); Luckett v. Bodner, 2009 WI 68, ¶ 29, 318 Wis. 2d 423, 769 
N.W.2d 504 (“When ‘a state rule mirrors the federal rule, we consider federal cases 
interpreting the rule to be persuasive authority.’” (quoting Wisconsin v. Evans, 2000 WI 
App 178, ¶ 8 n.2, 238 Wis. 2d 411, 617 N.W.2d 220)). 
 254. See, e.g., R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holdman, 470 So. 2d 60, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (citing Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1968), when applying 
the state relation back rule); Kest v. Hanna Ranch, Inc., 785 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1990) (“[W]e will consider pertinent federal decisions interpreting FRCP Rule 15(c), since 
they are deemed ‘to be highly persuasive’ in the construction of our Rule 15(c).” (quoting 
Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 824 (Haw. 1969))); Perrin v. Stensland, 240 P.3d 1189, 1193 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (applying the United States Supreme Court’s construction of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 15(c) to the state’s corresponding relation back rule). 
 255. Beal ex rel. Martinez v. City of Seattle, 954 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Wash. 1998). 
 256. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.190(c). 
 257. See id. 
 258. Schwartz ex rel. Schwartz v. Wilt Chamberlain’s of Boca Raton, Ltd., 725 So. 2d 
451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 259. See, e.g., Ron’s Quality Towing, Inc. v. Se. Bank of Fla., 765 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam); R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc., 470 So.2d at 68; Schachner v. 
Sandler, 616 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 260. The Advisory Committee Notes to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) state: 
This subdivision specifically provides that substitution of plaintiffs in order to 
bring the real party in interest before the court shall have the same effect had 
the action been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. This, in 
effect, makes the doctrine in relation back of amendments changing parties 
applicable to plaintiffs and is the companion to similar treatment for defendants 
found in Rule 15. 
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that the defendant “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper party, the substituted or joined party 
would have brought the action against him.”261 Regardless of how liberally 
or narrowly a particular federal jurisdiction allows relation back under Rule 
15(c), the prevailing interpretation of the state law must control in these 
cases.262 
V. Implications in the Class Action Context 
Relation back of plaintiffs can have particularly significant implications 
in the class action context. For example, in Page, the plaintiff originally 
filed an individual action.263 The “nationwide class of indeterminate size” 
she sought to add after the limitations period expired would have included 
“all persons whose benefits had not vested under the terms of a retirement 
plan in violation of ERISA’s strict vesting requirements, and for whom [the 
defendant] nevertheless [had] refused to guarantee benefit payments.”264 
Although increased liability alone is not considered sufficient prejudice to 
deny relation back,265 such a massive change in the scope of the litigation 
also “make[s] a mockery of . . . repose.”266 Thus, to respect the statute of 
limitations, it appears that allowing relation back of class actions should 
only be allowed in exceptional cases. 
An additional consideration is a principle the Supreme Court put forth in 
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.267 In that case, the Court noted 
that for tolling purposes, policies underlying the statute of limitations are 
satisfied when the initiation of a class action “notifies . . . defendants not 
only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the 
number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate 
                                                                                                                 
ALA. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee’s note (1973); see also Blue Star Ready Mix v. 
Cleveland ex rel. Cleveland, 473 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1985). 
 261. Blue Star Ready Mix, 473 So. 2d at 499 (emphasis added). 
 262. See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 
2002) (holding that where the amendments are filed prior to removal to federal court, state 
civil procedure rules, rather than the federal rules, apply); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c) 
(“These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the 
state courts and govern procedure after removal.” (emphasis added)). 
 263. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 264. Id. 
 265. In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (D. Alaska 1990). 
 266. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Page, 130 F.R.D. at 
513 (“Such a principle would effectively nullify the statute of limitations and its assurance of 
some repose to a defendant.”). 
 267. 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974). 
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in the judgment.”268 Later, in Perry v. Beneficial Finance Co. of N.Y., the 
Western District of New York relied on this rationale to limit a proposed 
class to those members for whom the statute of limitations had not yet 
expired.269 The court reasoned that because the original single-plaintiff 
action did not apprise the defendant of the size and generic identities of the 
proposed class members, any claims barred by the statute of limitations 
would not relate back.270 
Thus, under Perry, no amendments adding class plaintiffs would likely 
ever be allowed to relate back to a lawsuit filed as a single-plaintiff action. 
Conversely, under the Seventh Circuit’s transactional approach, virtually 
any individual action could be amended to include class claims after the 
limitations period has expired. Finally, courts applying the Williams 
standard requiring notice of the existence and involvement of the new 
plaintiff may or may not find that such an amendment should relate back. 
The majority of courts applying the Williams standard are in agreement that 
an individual complaint does not ordinarily provide adequate notice of the 
claims of potential class members.271 Class claims, if permitted to relate 
back at all, are restricted to those cases where, as in Sokolski, the original 
complaint makes specific references to “new plaintiffs,”272 or where, as in 
Page, a plaintiff in an individual action purported to assert claims on behalf 
of a proposed class in settlement negotiations.273 However, even where a 
plaintiff asserts class-wide demands in settlement negotiations, if the class 
has not yet been certified, the plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to 
assert claims on behalf of the other class members; and absent that 
authority, a defendant might not have reason to believe that the new 
plaintiffs’ claims were actually being asserted in the original complaint. 
VI. Courts Should Apply a Narrow Involvement Approach 
Courts should allow relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs only 
when defendants had notice of the existence and involvement of the new 
plaintiffs, as articulated in Williams. This approach allows relation back 
when the new claim is transactionally related to the original claim and the 
defendant had notice of both the existence and involvement of the new 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. at 555. 
 269. 81 F.R.D. 490, 495 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 270. Id.; see also Clif J. Shapiro, Note, Amendments That Add Plaintiffs Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 671, 685 (1982). 
 271. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. 
 272. Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 273. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 513 (D.D.C. 1990). 
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plaintiff within the notice period set out in Rule 15(c)(1)(C). The 
involvement approach furthers the policy of adjudicating claims on the 
merits while upholding the policies behind statutes of limitations.274 This 
approach is more practical than applying “mistake of identity” to plaintiffs, 
but serves the same limiting function. A more liberal approach, allowing 
relation back of all amendments adding new parties as long as they assert 
transactionally-related claims, would enlarge substantive rights and 
possibly render Rule 15(c) invalid under the Rules Enabling Act.275 
Furthermore, such an approach “would undermine applicable statutes of 
limitations and make a mockery of the promise of repose.”276 
A. The Standard for Finding Involvement 
To effectively uphold the policies behind the statute of limitations, the 
standard for finding involvement must be restrictively applied. As a 
threshold requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the amendment 
asserts a claim arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out, 
or attempted to be set out, in the original complaint. Then, the court must 
consider whether the defendant had notice that the plaintiff to be brought in 
by amendment asserted or attempted to assert a claim in court during the 
limitations period. 
First, the original plaintiff must have had the capacity to assert claims on 
behalf of the new plaintiff.277 Second, circumstances must also indicate that 
the plaintiff was asserting those representative claims. Thus, demands made 
on behalf of the new party in settlement negotiations would provide notice 
sufficient to allow relation back, but only if an existing plaintiff had a right 
to assert those demands on the new plaintiff’s behalf.278 Likewise, explicit 
references to “new plaintiffs” in the original complaint could indicate to the 
defendant that another party was involved, but only if the existing plaintiff 
had the right to assert those claims on behalf of those plaintiffs. Settlement 
negotiations by an individual on behalf of a proposed class do not provide 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Dismissal of an untimely claim is considered a decision on the merits, not a mere 
technicality. United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922) (stating that a 
limitations defense is “substantial and meritorious” and noting that “[s]tatutes of limitation 
are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law”). 
 275. See infra Part IV.D. 
 276. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 277. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 203-13, 273 (discussing whether assertion of 
class-wide demands in settlement negotiations indicates “involvement” of the putative 
class). 
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sufficient notice to allow relation back if the individual has not yet been 
certified to represent the class members. 
B. The Involvement Approach Addresses the Policies Underlying Statutes of 
Limitations 
As the Advisory Committee Note makes clear, the primary policy 
concern when dealing with relation back is the statute of limitations.279 The 
involvement approach has the advantage of imposing requirements that 
speak to the policies behind statutes of limitations. This approach implicitly 
addresses the statute of limitations by requiring that “the defendant must 
have had, within the applicable limitations period, adequate notice of the 
new plaintiffs, and that the original suit in effect asserted their claims as 
well.”280 First, this approach protects the defendant’s interest in repose by 
limiting the number of potential new plaintiffs to those who were 
essentially embraced by the original claim. Thus, the involvement 
requirement serves as an effective substitute for the mistake provision in 
Rule 15(c). Both requirements uphold the statute of limitations policies by 
limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiff has attempted to 
assert a claim during the statutory period, while screening out cases where 
the plaintiff simply seeks to take advantage of relation back to circumvent 
the statute of limitations. Without this limiting safeguard, potentially 
unlimited numbers of additional plaintiffs “could cause defendants’ liability 
to increase geometrically and their defensive strategy to become far more 
complex long after the statute of limitations had run.”281 As the Leachman 
court aptly pointed out: “At some point, defendants should have notice of 
who their adversaries are.”282 This is particularly obvious in the class action 
context, when a small individual action could become a nationwide class 
action suit long after the statute of limitations has expired. Furthermore, by 
imposing a notice requirement, this approach prevents prejudice to the 
defendant by ensuring that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s 
involvement before the limitations period had passed. 
C. The Absence of Prejudice Alone is Not an Effective Test 
Courts espousing a liberal standard for relation back of amendments 
adding plaintiffs argue that claims arising from the same transaction or 
occurrence should relate back simply because they provide notice, and that 
                                                                                                                 
 279. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 280. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 281. Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 282. Id. 
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this notice ensures the defendant will not be prejudiced.283 However, this 
argument fails because while an initial suit might place the defendant on 
notice of the existence of other potential plaintiffs, it does not give notice 
that these other potential plaintiffs are involved in the case or that they plan 
to become involved.284 As the First Circuit pointed out in Young v. Lepone, 
“[S]uch minimal notice hardly suffices to avert undue prejudice” to the 
defendant.285 Even where the claims are identical, the addition of new 
plaintiffs may “entail new legal theories and tactics against which [the 
defendant] must defend.”286 
Furthermore, notice merely for the sake of preventing prejudice does not 
go far enough in addressing the underlying policies behind the statute of 
limitations. First, even if no specific prejudice is shown, an untimely claim 
violates the defendant’s interest in repose.287 Moreover, as the Williams 
court pointed out, when belatedly introducing a new party, “something else 
is added” to the usual notice requirement.288 That “something else” is 
encompassed in the “mistake of identity” requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) 
by limiting amendments adding defendants to those defendants the plaintiff 
tried to bring in during the limitations period, but was not able to because of 
a mistake. To satisfy the policies behind the statute of limitations, it is 
necessary to limit new plaintiffs by excluding those whose untimeliness is 
due to inexcusable negligence, and to include only those who were in fact 
involved in the litigation from the beginning. Requiring only a showing of 
notice allows plaintiffs to contravene the statute of limitations by taking 
advantage of the diligence of others. 
D. Rules Enabling Act and Erie Doctrine Considerations 
Recognizing the substantive policy behind statutes of limitations, some 
courts have been wary of expanding a plaintiff’s right to bring a lawsuit.289 
Because substantive rights may not be enlarged or modified by procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). See generally Shapiro, 
supra note 270. 
 284. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 285. Id. at 17. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309. 
 288. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 289. See, e.g., Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 
2005). 
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rule,290 interpreting the rule in a way that does so would “run afoul of the 
Rules Enabling Act.”291 
Likewise, a restrictive approach may be necessary under the theory that 
relation back of plaintiffs is not covered by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure at all. The Advisory Committee’s Notes only suggest that “the 
attitude taken . . . extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs” 
as well.292 Thus, it is possible that the committee merely invites courts to 
deal with this issue themselves. If so, an expansive judicially-created 
relation back doctrine in conflict with substantive state limitations statutes 
could violate the Erie Doctrine, as it would result in “an ‘inequitable 
administration’ of the law.”293 Some courts have recognized this as a 
constraint on their ability to allow relation back liberally.294 It is for this 
reason that some literal-interpretation courts adhere to the text of Rule 
15(c).295 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the limitation in Asher v. Unarco 
Material Handling, Inc., observing that “[i]f the drafters of Rule 15(c) had 
intended to permit relation back on these facts, the rule would have so 
stated. Similarly, had the [state] legislature wanted the claims of untimely 
plaintiffs to escape the time bar . . . it would have spoken.”296 
Conclusion 
In keeping with the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
courts are instructed to allow amendments liberally in order to promote the 
adjudication of conflicts on the merits. It does not follow, however, that this 
policy should also require amendments to relate back liberally. Dismissal 
because a claim is time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations is a 
                                                                                                                 
 290. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 n.26 (1974) (“The Enabling 
Act empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure commands that ‘[s]uch 
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right . . . .’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072)). 
 291. Brever, 233 F.R.D. at 435; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); Yorden v. Flaste, 374 
F. Supp. 516, 520 n.17 (D. Del. 1974) (“The potential conflict between this Federal Rule and 
the state statute of limitations may raise an Erie problem.”). 
 292. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(C) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 293. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (quoting Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)); see also id. at 747 (“[T]he ‘outcome-determination’ test 
of Erie and York [must] be read with reference to the ‘twin aims’ of Erie: ‘discouragement 
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’” (quoting 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468)). 
 294. See Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 295. See id. 
 296. Id. 
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substantive and meritorious defense, and defendants should be deprived of 
the protections of the statute of limitations only when the underlying 
policies behind the statute have been upheld. A relation back rule requiring 
that defendants have notice that the new plaintiff attempted to assert a claim 
in court during the limitations period will enable plaintiffs to bring 
meritorious claims while ensuring “essential fairness” to the defendant by 
upholding the policies underlying the statute of limitations. 
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